Personal-level explanations in behavioral sciences of non-human animals.
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Abstract
The distinction between personal and subpersonal levels of psychological explanation has proved useful in order to differentiate ways of understanding human behavior. Yet little has been discussed about how these kinds of explanations would work in making sense non-animals’ intelligent behavior. In this paper I assess the main characterizations of personal and subpersonal explanations and how they could be applied in interpreting animal behavior in a scientific setting. Specifically, my claim is that personal level explanation is especially relevant to explain human actions as singular events. Through this, I will argue that instances of animal behavior can potentially be taken as singular events in the same way in which we take human action to be. Thus, personal level explanation plays an important role in behavioral sciences of non-human animals.
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