Political control over the executive in Argentina Incentives and the practice of interpellation control, from Menem to Fernández de Kirchner

Abstract

The article addresses congressional political control over the Executive from a political perspective with empirical anchoring, which does not focus on the mechanisms by which the Executive is accountable to the Congress, but on the Congress itself. By taking the Chamber of Deputies’ interpellations as a reference, and comparing presidencies and political bloc structures for almost two decades (1994-2011), an empirical-analytical study is conducted, which unravels the structure of political and institutional incentives intended to encourage or obstruct the exercise of congressional political control. It is confirmed that the Argentine Congress is sometimes active, but always ineffective (technological restrictions arisingfrom institutional design) in terms ofcontrol. At the same time, it may be concluded that parliamentary scenarios more akin to control are those where competitive and slightly fragmented parties encourage opposition minorities to take control actions. The article contributes to political science debate and conceptual discussion about the potential of congressional political control in presidential democracies, while providing evidence on the control activities conducted in a particular system.