Three decades of false belief task

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Published: Aug 20, 2016
DOI: https://doi.org/10.32348/1852.4206.v8.n2.10464
Keywords:
false belief task, folk psychology, philosophy of mind, psychological attribution

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Tomas Balmaceda
Universidad Nacional de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras

Abstract

The same paper that gave rise to Folk Psychology as an area of relevance in Philosophy of Mind inspired the False Belief Task, an experiment that undergone numerous transformations over the years and were interpreted in different –sometimes even incompatible- ways. Three decades after its first use in the area, the test is as valid as ever and continues generating controversy among philosophers and psychologists. The paper aims to track and systematize its genealogy, elucidating the conceptual basis behind it, and it tries to explain why the False Belief Task is still considered an adequate way to determine if an individual is in possession of Folk Psychological skills (i.e. mind-reading abilities).

Article Details

How to Cite
Three decades of false belief task. (2016). Argentinean Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 8(2), 5-21. https://doi.org/10.32348/1852.4206.v8.n2.10464
Issue
Vol. 8 No. 2 (2016): Número Especial: "Historia de las Ciencias del Comportamiento"
Section
Original Articles

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Author Biography

Tomas Balmaceda, Universidad Nacional de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras

Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas.

How to Cite

Three decades of false belief task. (2016). Argentinean Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 8(2), 5-21. https://doi.org/10.32348/1852.4206.v8.n2.10464

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