ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LEGAL SCIENCE THE CASE OF ARTICLE 19 OF ARGENTINEAN NATIONAL CONSTITUTION

Abstract

I will unfold in this work the consequences that for constitutional law has the assumption of a thesis that not for well-known has been less ignored, less taken into account in the doctrinal production, in the theoretical work of many of our constitutionalists. Sustained long ago by Ronald Dworkin, the thesis affirms that the constitutional clauses that establish rights and guarantees cannot be interpreted but appealing to our moral beliefs, specifically to our beliefs about what is the moral point of the law as a practice in general and of the particular institution that we are dealing with. It follows, in my opinion, that there can be no "legal science" in the classical sense, ie. description of the semantic content of legal texts, when the text in question is the Constitution. Appealing to the problem of what is the correct interpretation of article 19 of the Argentinean National Constitution, I will briefly present the scheme of work that I believe should be applied when we are dealing with constitutional cases.