Budgetary policy cycle in Chile: An exploratory study for the 2012 mayor elections
Keywords:
Budgetary policy cycle, Political Economy, Municipal ElectionsAbstract
The objective of this research is to explore the existence of budgetary political cycles at municipal level in Chile. As stated in the literature, the existence of budgetary policy cycle encourages / motivates a politician in exercise to modify the structure of expenditure with the objective of obtaining re-election in office. In the case of the elections of mayor of Chile in 2012, we made a cross-section estimation and the results show a positive relationship of the municipal spending of the 2 years prior to the election over the vote received by an incumbent. In addition, the previous vote of the incumbent and the membership of a political coalition affect the percentage of votes received.
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