Argentina's provinces and the political-budgetary cycle: an analysis in 30 years of democracy
Keywords:
Fiscal Policy, Political Economic Cycle, ProvincesAbstract
This article is about the existence of budge policy cycles in the Argentine provinces and the City of Buenos Aires during the period 1983-2004, as well as for the period when FPV was in charge of the government (2003-2014). To do that, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) is used, working with dynamic panel data. The results show evidence of the presence of cycles of electoral origin on the total expenditure of the provinces in both periods. In particular, for the 2003-2014 period there is a strong bias towards the current components of spending (consumer spending and current transfers), while the evidence is scarce for the case of capital spending (real direct investment). The cycle is consistently tested for all three items in the full period (1983-2014).
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