Intentional explanations and teleological explanations of animal behaviour

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Published: May 10, 2011
DOI: https://doi.org/10.32348/1852.4206.v3.n1.5233
Keywords:
intentional stance, teleological stance, animal cognition, intentional attribution

Main Article Content

Laura Danón
Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Psicologia

Abstract

This paper examines two philosophical proposals about the requirements which must be satisfied in order to legitimately apply intentional explanations to non-human animals. Firstly, I evaluate Daniel Dennett’s intentional stance approach, and I present a well-known critique against it: the risk of over-attribution of intentional states that it comports. Secondly, I turn to Mark Okrent’s attempt to refine Dennett’s original position, by distinguishing between an intentional stance and a teleological one. Even when this strategy seems useful to deal with the problem of overattribution of intentionality, it faces its own problems. As I will try to show, there are behaviors of non-human animals that can be explained neither by the teleological stance, nor by the intentional stance. Finally, I will suggest that, in order to overcome this problem, Okrent’s requirements for the legitimate application of the intentional stance should be revised and mitigated.

Article Details

How to Cite
Intentional explanations and teleological explanations of animal behaviour. (2011). Argentinean Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 3(1), 54-63. https://doi.org/10.32348/1852.4206.v3.n1.5233
Issue
Vol 3, No 1 (2011): Special Issue: "Intentionality and Conscience: Recent Approaches"
Section
Intencionalidad y Conciencia: Abordajes Recientes

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Author Biography

Laura Danón, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Facultad de Psicologia

Profesora Asistente. Problemas Epistemológicos de la Psicología. Facultad de Psicología

How to Cite

Intentional explanations and teleological explanations of animal behaviour. (2011). Argentinean Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 3(1), 54-63. https://doi.org/10.32348/1852.4206.v3.n1.5233

References

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