Phenomenal knowledge without phenomenal concepts? on Jesse Prinz’ theory of mental pointers

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Published: May 10, 2011
DOI: https://doi.org/10.32348/1852.4206.v3.n1.5234
Keywords:
phenomenal knowledge, consciousness, attention, phenomenal concepts, mental pointers

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Sergio Daniel Barberis
Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Departamento de Filosofía

Abstract

The aim of the present paper is to present and criticize the reply of Jesse Prinz (2007) to the “knowledge argument” proposed by Jackson (1982). Prinz’ proposal relies on two tenets: in the first place, it is supported by an original neurocognitive theory about consciousness; in the second place, it rests on a philosophical theory about phenomenal knowledge that seems to avoid the supposition of phenomenal concepts (versus Loar, Tye and Papineau, inter alia). I argue that Prinz’ proposal is inadequate both on empirical grounds – concerning his theory of consciousness – and on more conceptual grounds – concerning his conception of phenomenal knowledge. I conclude that the postulation of phenomenal concepts seems to be unavoidable in order to explain the nature of phenomenal knowledge.

Article Details

How to Cite
Phenomenal knowledge without phenomenal concepts? on Jesse Prinz’ theory of mental pointers. (2011). Argentinean Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 3(1), 64-74. https://doi.org/10.32348/1852.4206.v3.n1.5234
Issue
Vol 3, No 1 (2011): Special Issue: "Intentionality and Conscience: Recent Approaches"
Section
Intencionalidad y Conciencia: Abordajes Recientes

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Author Biography

Sergio Daniel Barberis, Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Departamento de Filosofía

Ayudante de 1era en las materias "Metafísica" y "Problemas de Metafísica". Ayudante de 1era en las materias "Filosofía de la Ciencia" y "Filosofía especial de la Ciencia", UBA, FFyL, Departamento de Filosofía.

How to Cite

Phenomenal knowledge without phenomenal concepts? on Jesse Prinz’ theory of mental pointers. (2011). Argentinean Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 3(1), 64-74. https://doi.org/10.32348/1852.4206.v3.n1.5234

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